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Abstract 
Regional integration is on the political agenda in all parts of the world. During the time of 
post-colonial development and liberation struggles, Southern Africa saw its share of attempts 
at closer economic and political ties between states within the region. Today, the dominant 
regional organization in Southern Africa is the Southern African Development Community. 
Many regional organizations in the developing world, including SADC, explicitly state that a 
large part of the regional integration project is towards a goal of attracting an increase in 
foreign direct investment. The ability to attract FDI is based on various factors; covering 
many of these is the combined level of perceived political risk. Economic and political 
instability, social unrest, ethnic and military conflict, corruption in government, the threat of 
expropriation and breaches of contract; political risk is a multi-faceted concept. The thesis 
identifies what types of political risks are prevalent in the Southern African region. The 
research focus addresses what SADC as a regional actor has contributed towards lowering the 
levels of political risk in specific countries and parts of the region. The thesis demonstrates 
that as theoretical assumptions and empirical evidence argue that regional integration is 
positive for the ability to attract FDI, Southern African countries face many obstacles on the 
way towards a fully integrated economic community. Meanwhile, the prospects for peace and 
security in the region are better at present than twenty years ago. The establishment and 
maintenance of legal, security and financial frameworks that would add to securing the 
interests of both the foreign investors and the host country and government are often lacking. 
Furthermore, the implementation of regional institutions have been hampered by various 
factors, including the member states’ own interests and a general unwillingness towards 
ceding sovereignty to transnational institutions . The role of South Africa as a regional 
hegemon and key policy-maker within SADC is discussed in order to further examine the 
regional dynamics in Southern Africa. 
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"An investment in knowledge pays the best interest."  
- Benjamin Franklin 
 
Introduction 
The topic of this research paper is regional integration efforts in Southern Africa and its 
effects on the political risk for foreign direct investment. The research will aim to explain 
whether the consequences of regional integration through the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) have lowered the perceived level of political risk for foreign investment 
in the organization’s member states. The aim of the research is to identify and explain 
whether transnational agreements, frameworks and cooperation have had an effect on certain 
indicators for the political risk facing previous, ongoing and potential investment in the region. 
The regional organization’s effectiveness and development over the last twenty years will 
come under scrutiny in the effort to address the research question and test theoretical 
hypotheses. Regional organizations generally aim to serve the same purposes as global 
organizations. The goal of regionalization is often increased security, economic, 
developmental and technical cooperation between neighbouring states (Karns and Mingst 
2010: 145). In what is still called the developing world, and in particular in sub-Saharan 
Africa, regionalism is viewed as a mechanism for promoting both economic development and 
political independence through reconfiguring unfair trading practices often stemming from 
neo-colonial influences (Gibb 2009: 702). The regional projects taking place in the 
developing world since the end of the Cold War were a reaction to always increasing 
globalization and the need of state and regions to better their competitiveness in the global 
marketplace (Taylor 2011: 1233). Regional integration is also encouraged by donors, 
multilateral agencies, NGOs and (foreign) national governments (Gibb 2009: 703). The 
efforts to develop and maintain frameworks for regional cooperation in the Southern African 
region have a long history, dating back to the establishing of the Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU)1 in 1910. In the Southern African region today, SADC is the dominant 
                                                             
1 Established in 1910 as a Customs Union Agreement between the Union of South Africa and the High 
Commission Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland. The agreement was updated in 1969 
following independence from colonial rule for Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho. Namibia joined in 1990, after 
independence from South Africa. SACU is the world’s oldest existing customs union (WTO 2003). 
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regional organization, with 15 member states2 working to develop transnational frameworks 
for cooperation within economic, political, security, legal and developmental issues. As usual 
within the developing world, the dominant economic power, South Africa, is also the most 
eager promoter of regional integration in Southern Africa (Taylor 2011: 1235). When South 
Africa during the early 1990’s abolished apartheid and became a democratic country, the 
politics of regionalism in Southern Africa changed from being one of separation to one of 
integration (Gibb 2006: 1). Still the country with the largest economy, South Africa has the 
leading role within SADC and influences the political economy of its neighbouring states 
(Mlambo 2005, Amos 2010). Foreign direct investment3 is an important asset to developing 
countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition to supplementing domestic 
investments and savings, FDI can contribute to technology transfers, an increase in 
management skills and knowledge, increased market access, a higher productivity through 
better competition in the domestic economy and help integrate the domestic economy with 
international economic activity (Cleeve 2008: 137). As one of the goals of regional 
organizations, especially within the developing world, is to attract increased foreign 
investment (Mhlanga et. al. 2010), to what extent does regional economic, political, legal and 
security cooperation between states contribute to a positive climate for foreign direct 
investment? As a starting point, the central research question is: To what extent have regional 
integration efforts in Southern Africa mitigated the political risk for foreign direct investment? 
The thesis will argue that regional integration efforts in Southern Africa over the last twenty 
years overall have had some positive effects on the political risk climate for FDI. In theory, 
the frameworks set up through transnational trade, legal, security and political agreements 
should be beneficial to the member states overall financial and political stability and both 
directly and indirectly help attract foreign investment. In practice, economic policies 
influenced by SADC and South Africa have benefited the inflow of FDI into some member 
states, especially those who are close to South Africa both in terms of geography and  
multilateral agreements such as trade and monetary unions. On several occasions, SADC has 
been active in attempts to control political and financial instability in its member states. But, 
there are clear limitations to the success of regional integration in Southern Africa, both on 
account of SADC’s ineffectiveness, the economic and political turmoil stemming from the 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
 
2 SADC member states are Angola, Botswana, DR Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (SADC 2014). 
3 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is defined as “cross-border investment by a resident entity in one economy 
with the objective of obtaining a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in another economy” (OECD 2013). 
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member states’ own historical development, policies and decisions, and the general 
unwillingness to share sovereignty and sign up for further integration. Drawing on realist 
assumptions concerning regional hegemony and stability, it will be argued that the presence 
of a regional hegemon, in this case South Africa, will constrain bad behaviour from 
neighbouring states, and hence provide a better climate for attracting foreign direct investment. 
The limitations of this argument will also become apparent. The similarities and differences in 
the member states commitment to regional integration, their history, political development 
and geographical location, as well as their relationship with South Africa, will illustrate the 
effects of regional integration on a member state’s level of political risk for FDI. 
 
Literature review – regional integration, political risk and FDI 
Literature that identifies direct or indirect links between regional integration and FDI exist, 
albeit in various forms and focal points. This literature deals with the regional organization 
and its member states’ political decisions and macroeconomic determinants for a larger 
attraction of FDI. There also exist literature with a research focus on the effects of political 
risk on inflows of FDI. Concerning the research question, the aim of this literature review is 
to compare and synthesize findings from articles that concentrates mainly or partly with what 
effects regional integration and political risk have on the optimal conditions for attracting FDI. 
The literature identifies hypotheses, findings and arguments within this specific topic. Many 
of the optimal conditions listed implies lowered political risk for FDI. This connection will be 
elaborated in the theory section. As a starting point, one overarching theoretical assumption is 
that a stable political environment, both within and between states, provides a better climate 
for attracting foreign investment (Amos 2010, Lederman et. al. 2013). Te Velde and Bezemer 
(2006) researched whether being part of a regional organization is beneficial for a country’s 
inflow of FDI. The study shows that while membership in a regional organization is beneficial, 
smaller states and states located in the region’s periphery benefit less from being part of a 
regional grouping than large states and states closer to the core of the region. The authors call 
for future investigation into what determines whether a particular country attracts more FDI as 
the result of regional integration (ibid. 2006: 64). A further step in the direction of confirming 
a positive relationship between regional integration and the ability to attract FDI is taken by 
Dahl (2002). Specifically concentrating on the SADC region and inflows of FDI, the author 
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concludes that belonging to a regional grouping is seen as having high explanatory value for 
attracting FDI (Dahl 2002: 17). 
 
The following paragraph will distinguish between positive and negative factors affecting a 
country’s attractiveness for FDI. While some literature discusses other parts of the world or 
all “developing countries”, a share of the articles have an emphasis on sub-Saharan Africa or 
Southern Africa. Busse and Hefeker (2007) find that in particular government stability, law 
and order, bureaucratic quality and democratic accountability are important determinants of 
foreign investment flows. This relates to other findings, where an efficient legal system and a 
good investment framework promote FDI. Countries with a functioning democratic system, 
worthy socioeconomic conditions and investment profile attract larger proportions of FDI 
(Cleeve 2012: 476). Regional economic cooperation, improving a country’s institutions and 
policy environment, and the larger market that can be a result of regional integration, all are 
positive factors for attracting FDI (Mlambo 2005: 574-575, Asiedu 2006: 74). Protocols on 
free movements of people, goods and services, initiated by regional arrangements, will extend 
a country’s markets beyond their national boundaries (Cleeve 2012: 476). In addition, 
membership in a regional organization can increase the bilateral intra-state trade in the region 
(Afesorgbor and van Bergeijk 2011). As a successful outcome of multilateral trade 
agreements, increased intra-regional trade between states often helps attract increased FDI to 
the region (Gibb 2007, Bezuidenhout and Naudé 2008: 2). Concerning what constrains FDI, 
administrative barriers and financial instability are among the factors that keep investors out 
of an area (Mlambo 2005: 562). Previous findings, mainly from the 1960’s and 1970’s, 
regarding which political risk factors are detrimental to FDI inflows are summarized by Singh 
and Jun (1995). These include the number of strikes and riots, socio-political instability, 
constitutional changes and aggressive behaviour within the political system against groups or 
officeholders. Singh and Jun also find political risk to be significantly detrimental for the 
inflow of FDI to developing countries (ibid. 1995: 1, 5-6).  Political instability, internal and 
external conflicts, ethnic tensions and corruption are also constraints to the inflow of FDI 
(Dahl 2002, Asiedu 2006, Busse and Hefeker 2007). Poorly developed political institutions 
can be a tell-tale sign that breaches of contract, corruption in high levels and expropriation are 
more likely to be seen as potential threats to foreign investments (Jakobsen 2010: 485). 
Studies have shown that higher levels of political risk in a country negatively affects the 
inflow of FDI (Anyanwu 2012: 436-437). Considering these findings, there is a potentially 
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positive link between successful regional integration, implying institutional, political and 
financial stability, a larger market size, and an increase in FDI. 
 
An analysis of this topic would be lacking without proper historical accounts and academic 
insights into the regional dynamics in Southern Africa. The following section discusses South 
Africa’s role in the region. A regional hegemon can affect economic factors and political 
stability. In addition, the hegemon can influence whether other states benefit from regional 
integration. The region covered by SADC is the most developed in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 
the largest contributor to the African economy (Bezuidenhout and Naudé 2008: 3). Similar to 
Nigeria in West Africa, and arguably Kenya in the Eastern region, South Africa is the 
dominant regional hegemon in the Southern African region. The country’s large and 
comparatively developed economy can be identified as a “pull-factor” for investment in the 
region and the “gateway” to foreign direct investment to the developing world  (Mlambo 2005: 
561, Gibb 2007, Amos 2010). The change in policies undertaken in Southern Africa during 
the 1990’s have led to a political economy where neighbouring countries “inevitably and 
significantly” are influenced by South Africa’s economic growth, neo-liberalism, free trade 
and democratization. Establishing a free trade area within SADC has given the other member 
states a hope to receive investments from both South Africa and other foreign investors (Gibb 
2007: 433-434). On the other hand, the behaviour of a regional hegemon can increase already 
existing economic disparities between member states within a regional integration project 
(Krapohl and Fink 2013). The presence of a regional growth-pole, such as South Africa in 
SADC, could lead to the most developed country gaining the most from open trade, with 
weaker states receiving less of the benefits from lower tariffs and industry relocation. This 
could lead to political tension, which effectively undermines a regional integration process 
(Draper 2012: 75). Therefore, when cooperation comes into conflict with a state’s own 
interest, it is likely to cease (Gibb 2009: 714). Important to any analysis of regional dynamics 
are weak and unstable states. In the time concerned, events in the member states Angola, DR 
Congo, Madagascar and Zimbabwe have contributed to destabilizing the SADC region. These 
elements can be disruptive to the execution and implementation of common goals within a 
regional organization, and undermine its authority (Gibb 2007, Amos 2010). Related to this, 
some authors stress the importance for SADC to limit the negative effects of being in a “bad 
neighbourhood” (Dahl 2002, Bezuidenhout and Naudé 2008). The overlapping memberships 
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in various regional organizations and trade agreements is also an important challenge to 
further regional integration in Africa (Gibb 2007: 433, 2009, Genna and Lombaerde 2010). 
 
Theoretical framework 
What is political risk? A further explanation of the concept will give an insight into how 
foreign investors and political risk agencies view the political climate in countries and regions 
when analysing potential destinations for investment. The political risk agency Eurasia Group 
together with PriceWaterhouseCoopers define political risk as “any political change that alters 
the expected outcome and value of a given economic action by changing the probability of 
achieving business objectives” (Eurasia Group and PWC 2006: 6). A similar definition is 
“unanticipated government actions that have an impact on business operations” (Sethi and 
Luther 1986: 59). The factors for measuring political risk by Political Risk Services’ 
International Country Risk Guide are as follows: Economic expectations versus reality, 
economic planning failures, political leadership, external conflict, corruption in government, 
military in politics, organized religion in politics, law and order tradition, racial and national 
tensions, political terrorism, civil war, political party development and quality of the 
bureaucracy (Erb et. al. 1996: 32). Similarly, Bremmer and Keat (2009) list geopolitics, 
terrorism, internal political strife, expropriations and breaches of contract, subtle 
discrimination and favouritism among the main types of political risk. Contracts and 
agreements are not always “written in stone”, and the host governments are not always 
capable of controlling the motives and preferences of other actors within the host country, 
such as rebel groups, local communities, NGOs and opposition politicians (Jakobsen 2010: 
488). Especially when analysing weak states, it is important to understand the role of the 
society which the state claims to govern, and what role actors such as armed movements, 
regional strongmen and nations also have in the international system (Franke 2009: 18). 
Jakobsen’s (2010) first three sources of political risk are socio-political instability and 
grievances, political institutions, and preferences and attitudes. The fourth, the “obsolescing 
bargain mechanism”, has to be explained in some detail. The obsolescing bargain mechanism 
is the result of shifts in the bargaining power of the host country and the foreign investor4. 
When the invested capital is sunk into the host country, the host automatically increases its 
leverage by having increased power over the investment. When the host has a will to 
                                                             
4 Jakobsen (2010) mostly refers to multinational corporations (MNCs) when discussing foreign investors. 
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intervene, for example in the form of expropriation or other breaches of contract, this is more 
likely to occur once the initial investment has been conducted. Hence, the relative political 
risk increases after the first investment, and the investors’ capital is sunk in the host country 
(Jakobsen 2010: 483). Arguably, not all political risk factors can be mitigated by a regional 
organization. Concerning regional tension and instability, there are several reasons why the 
local regional organization should play a part in conflict mitigation. A regional organization is 
more familiar with its own region than larger international organizations. Better knowledge of 
cultural, social and historical factors can make the RO more effective, and the geographical 
proximity enables a response that is faster and less expensive (Van der Vleuten and Hoffman 
2010, Ancas 2011, Nathan 2013). 
 
The following section posits three hypotheses regarding the causal relationship between 
regional integration and the ability to attract an increase in FDI. Based on the empirical 
findings in the literature review and further theoretical frameworks presented below, the 
hypotheses are framed in the direction of a positive relationship between regional integration 
efforts and an increase in FDI, through various mechanisms developing over time. Belonging 
to a regional organization is seen to have explanatory value for the ability to attract FDI (Dahl 
2002, Te Velde and Bezemer 2006). Economic cooperation through regional integration leads 
to a larger market size for foreign investors (Anyanwu 2012). For developing countries, 
regional integration is beneficial because regional market integration affects both the size of 
the market and the regional stability. Positive size and stability effects make a region more 
attractive for foreign investment (Krapohl et. al. 2014: 4). An efficient legal system and 
improvements in a country’s institutions and investment framework are additional positive 
factors for attracting FDI (Mlambo 2005, Asiedu 2006, Jensen 2008). Increased intra-regional 
will often lead to an increase in FDI (Gibb 2007, Bezuidenhout and Naudé 2008). Drawing on 
these findings, the first hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H1: Membership in a regional organization contributes to making a member state’s economic 
policies and political environment more attractive for foreign investment. 
 
Jensen (2008) researched whether the functioning establishment of democratic and 
transnational institutions contribute to lowering the political risk for foreign investment. The 
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argument suggests that transnational institutions, be they within legal, security or trade affairs, 
help constrain “bad behaviour” from member states. Blomström and Kokko (2003) describes 
multilateral policy coordination and harmonization of investment incentives between 
members of a regional organization as one way to attract more FDI. International treaties, 
pacts and concessions can be beneficial to safeguarding against some aspects of (political) 
risk for foreign investments (Sethi and Luther 1986: 63). Countries with functioning political 
institutions, such as the country’s own political and legal institutions, bilateral investment 
treaties and regional agreements, can expect more FDI. Functioning institutions is seen as one 
solution to the political risk associated with FDI (Kerner and Lawrence 2011).  
The second hypothesis provides an overarching assumption about the effects of 
regionalization. 
 
H2: Transnational institutions for legal, security, economic and developmental cooperation 
within a regional organization mitigates the political risk for foreign direct investment in the 
member states. 
 
The structural realist idea of a regional hegemon will be used to analyse South Africa’s role 
within the SADC, and in what way this role has evolved since 1994. Hegemonic stability 
theory implies that “order is the function of a powerful state within the region, a state which 
can impose peace and command both respect and power” (Paul 2012: 8). Realist reasoning 
about hegemonic stability posits that transnational cooperation will occur only when a 
benevolent hegemon has an interest in providing a collective good to, or on behalf of, a group 
of states. A regional hegemon should act as a paymaster and provide leadership when a region 
works towards regional integration. The hegemon necessarily needs to compensate the 
smaller member states’ distributive losses due to regional integration (Krapohl et. al. 2014:3). 
Working within a realist framework, Merom (2003) posits that weaker actors (states) within a 
region can be “captives” of the dominant state. When a given region is seen as contributing to 
the relative power and security of an actor within the system, the region becomes more valued 
and the chances that the actor will want to increase its control over the other actors within the 
region are higher (ibid. 2003: 112). Realist theory adds that international organizations are 
tools created by large and dominant powers for spreading their values and ideas, in addition to 
further strengthening their grasp on power (Tavares 2011: 146). In cases where relatively 
weak states have an ethnic affinity with populations living across their boundaries, a regional 
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order can be generated through spill-over effects from processes within the regional states 
themselves (Paul 2012: 12). When addressing multilateral political-economic cooperation, the 
role of South Africa within SADC makes the realist notions of a regional hegemon helpful for 
research on the power relationships between one powerful and several weak states. It will be 
assumed that South Africa is a regional hegemon that influences and dominates the other 
member states economically and politically, as well as dominating policy-making within 
SADC (Gibb 2007, Amos 2010). Following these insights, the third hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H3: The regional hegemon, South Africa, stabilizes the region by constraining bad behaviour 
from other states. This mitigates parts of the political risk for foreign direct investment in the 
region. 
 
Research Design 
The thesis will concentrate on the development in the Southern African region over the last 
twenty years. In 1994, South Africa joined SADC, and the politics of regional integration 
were significantly altered (Gibb 2007). Hence, SADC has been in its present incarnation since 
the early 90’s, with more states in the region joining the organization in 1997 (Buthelezi 
2006). In order to explain South Africa’s influence on SADC, the scope of the research is 
limited to the years where the regional hegemon has been a member, while references are 
made to the political situation in Southern Africa during the time of apartheid and regional 
conflicts in the 1970’s and 1980’s. This because South Africa set out to behave in a very 
different way towards its neighbours after the fall of apartheid and because the establishing of 
SADCC was a result of South Africa’s destabilizing policies during the 1970’s and 1980’s. 
The research will aim to explain whether there exists any connections between regional 
integration efforts, less relative political risk and inflow of foreign direct investment. The case 
selections when researching specific topics linked to regional integration can be wrong for 
many reasons. One reason pointed out by Genna and Lombaerde (2010) is the overlapping 
memberships in regional agreements by many countries. This is a challenge for analysing 
regional integration in Africa, where states can be members of up to 10 different regional 
integration arrangements. Here, the focus is on SADC and this particular organization’s 
development and influence. This means that although many of the SADC states are also 
members of other organizations, the deliberate focus is on the dominant regional organization 
in Southern Africa, namely SADC. Membership indexes, historical development and an 
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overview of the relevant treaties and transnational agreements are gathered from both 
SADC’s own sources and other articles. UNCTAD5 will provide FDI inflow numbers for the 
region. It is important to stress that the hypotheses all have the overarching assumption that 
regional integration efforts contribute to the mitigation of the various sources of political risk 
for FDI. As an example, functioning regional economic integration and trade agreements are 
in theory positive factors, while political turmoil and corruption are negative factors. Hence, 
the combined notion of political risk is to an extent mitigated if the theoretical assumptions 
and hypotheses match the empirical evidence. With the rejection of one or more hypotheses, 
regional integration efforts in Southern Africa could prove insignificant in mitigating the 
political risk for FDI. Country-specific policies and actions not influenced by SADC could 
have higher explanatory value. 
 
Analysis 
SADC – Background and prospects 
Originally comprised of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, the first 
meeting of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference took place in 1979. 
SADCC was set up as an organization in which the “Frontier States” would work towards 
reducing their economic dependency on apartheid South Africa, and establish and harmonize 
common goals and development plans (Buthelezi 2006: 167, Karns and Mingst 2010: 209). 
After the Cold War ended, Africa experienced a degree of resolution of on-going conflicts and 
strengthening of regional institutions (Paul 2012:11). By 1992, the focus of the organization 
had shifted from reducing the aforementioned states’ economic dependency on South Africa 
in terms of rail, air and port facilities, as well as imports of goods and raw materials, into an 
organization with the goal of establishing a fully integrated economic community. The 
regional institution that would soon become SADC turned its attention towards addressing the 
region’s political, military and economic challenges. This new organization now included 
Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia and Swaziland, and the first SADC treaty protocol was signed in 
1992 (Buthelezi 2006: 164-165, Franke 2009). Around 1994, many were optimistic about the 
region’s future. In addition to apartheid ending in South Africa, the civil war in Mozambique 
came to an end and Malawi saw a transition to democracy (Mbuende 2014: 250). The fall of 
                                                             
5 United Nations Conference on Trade And Development. 
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apartheid in South Africa made conditions more favourable for regional political and 
economic cooperation, while also restoring South Africa’s respectability both within the 
region and further internationally. At the same time, the Cold War was ending, which gave 
credibility to the triumph of the neo-liberal economic model over socialism. SADCC was 
transformed into SADC, and subsequently South Africa became a member in 1994 (Alden 
and Soko 2005: 369-374). After 2001, a revised SADC Treaty and a strengthening of the 
SADC Summit, the organization’s supreme policy-making authority, was put into reality in 
order for SADC to establish effective and coherent policies within both economic and security 
issues. The Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Co-operation operates under the 
guidelines of the Summit. The member states’ foreign affairs ministers are consulting under 
the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (van Nieuwkerk 2014: 55). The SADC 
Tribunal was established in Windhoek and became operational in late 2005. This was a strong 
signal that SADC member states would be willing to accept limitations to their sovereignty 
through the supervision of an international judicial branch (de Wet 2013: 48). 
The Windhoek Declaration of 1992 listed three main objectives:  
 
1. Deeper economic cooperation and integration, on the basis of balance, equity and mutual 
benefit, providing for cross-border investment and trade, and freer movement of factors of 
production, goods and services across national borders. 
 
2. Common economic, political and social values and systems, enhancing enterprise and 
competiveness, democracy and good governance, respect for rule of law and the guarantee of 
human rights, popular participation and alleviation of poverty. 
 
3. Strengthening regional solidarity, peace and security, in order for the people of the region 
to live and work together in peace and harmony. (Afesorgbor and Van Bergeijk 2011: 11). 
 
A more specific goal relating to the inflow of resources into the region can also be found in 
the original SADC Treaty of Windhoek: 
- Promotion of international understanding and co-operation and support, so as to mobilize the 
inflow of private and public resources into the region. (Buthelezi 2006: 174). 
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The SADC Treaty covers the obligations of the member states, the organization’s legal and 
institutional framework, principles and objectives, cooperation with other international 
organizations, financial issues and dispute settlements. It also covers the potential for 
sanctions, withdrawal and dissolution (Saurombe 2012: 5). The goals of the Windhoek 
Declaration itself give significant hints about the importance of foreign direct investment to 
the region. Since FDI is being viewed as beneficial for the recipient country, regional blocs 
and individual countries have actively developed policies in the hopes that this will attract a 
larger share of the world’s FDI. SADC has specifically addressed this in the Protocol of Trade 
from 1996 and more recently the Protocol on Finance and Investment from 2006. Objectives 
include industrialization, a deepening of the intra-regional trade liberalization and the 
promotion of foreign investment (Mahembe and Odhiambo 2013: 35). As referred to in the 
literature review, the values and goals listed among the main objectives should both in theory 
and practice be beneficial with regards to how the region and its member states are viewed by 
outside investors in terms of political risk. In order to be successful in attracting an increase in 
FDI, as well as the always highly valued aid from foreign governments and NGOs, the region 
had to work together in order to achieve political stability and functioning economic 
cooperation that would secure increased foreign investments. The following section will 
address whether SADC contributes towards securing peace and stability in the region, as well 
as which progress economic incentives stemming from SADC policies have been beneficial to 
the countries themselves and the foreign investors who want to establish their business in the 
region. As will be discussed, the empirical evidence will often show that prospects for further 
successful regional integration is being hampered by various factors; including state’s own 
interests, the respect of national sovereignty and a consequent unwillingness to share this. In 
addition, unstable political and economic environments in many of the countries, to an extent 
linked to Africa-specific historical developments, are hindrances to deeper cooperation 
between Southern African states. The successes and shortcomings of SADC are discussed 
later in the analysis. 
 
The challenges of regionalism in Southern Africa 
Although definitely linked, especially concerning political risk, this section will attempt to 
separate between the economic and the security dimensions of regional integration. This in 
order to analyze to what extent cooperation between SADC member states has been beneficial 
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to how the region is perceived in terms of potential political risk for foreign investors. In 
Southern Africa today, none of the SADC states are seen to be without some degree of 
political risk. While Namibia, Angola, Botswana and Zambia are classified as having an 
overall “low” level of political risk, in Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique and Madagascar the 
political risk is perceived as “high”. South Africa receives a “moderate” risk rating (PRS 
Group 2013). Firstly, a general explanation will be given in terms of member states’ interests 
and their lack of willingness to share sovereignty. Secondly, economic factors and policy-
decisions will be addressed, as these often help create a more attractive climate for foreign 
investors, albeit taking into account how developing countries can “pose as investor friendly” 
(Jakobsen 2010). Thirdly, SADC’s record of accomplishment within peace and security will 
illustrate to what extent the organization has helped create stability and lowered the risk for 
inter- and intra-state violence, coups and rebellions. As has been shown, these are all sources 
of concern and insecurity for potential foreign investments. 
 
Among the political factors linked to the development of regionalism are: power dynamics, 
identity (or shared perception of a definable region) and ideology, internal and external threats, 
domestic politics and leadership (Karns and Mingst 2010: 148). While shared identity has 
high explanatory value for many of the inter-state relationships in southern Africa, a larger 
emphasis must be put on domestic politics and the importance of national sovereignty when 
examining the history and outlook of regionalism in southern Africa. Sovereignty is defined 
as «the claim of supreme political authority within a territory» (Thomson 2004: 150). A 
reciprocal understanding and recognition of other states’ legitimacy and territorial sovereignty 
is beneficial to international relations, as it reduces the potential for conflict between states. 
Hence, the understanding of non-interference is also enshrined in international agreements, 
such as the charters of the United Nations. While African countries’ sovereignty is respected 
within the international community, the continent is still vulnerable to outside intervention, 
partly because of their economic and political fragility (ibid. 2004: 150). There is a link 
between countries that have fought a long and bloody war to end white minority rule, like 
Zimbabwe and South Africa, and an unwillingness to surrender sovereignty (Welz 2013). 
Regional institutions in Africa are relatively weak, because member states are reluctant to 
accept what the leaders see as an intrusion on the countries’ sovereignty. Furthermore, the 
member states have limited resources to use on integrative efforts (Karns and Mingst 2010: 
147). The SADC treaties, protocols and the setting up of various sub-regional institutions 
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have been identified as ambitious on paper, while many of the institutions do not have a good 
track record when it comes to actual implementation of policies and frameworks (Saurobme 
2012: 25). At any given time in post-colonial history, foreign policy decision-making in 
Africa has always been up to the plans, preferences and whims of leading personalities such 
as the presidents (van Nieuwkerk 2014: 52). One reason why regionalism has largely been 
unsuccessful in southern Africa is not the states themselves being weak. On the contrary, the 
regimes who are in control and governing many of the states are strong forces who for various 
reasons do not want regionalism to succeed. This is a key factor determining the level of 
success of regional integration in practice (Gibb 2009: 715). In effect, the values, worldview 
and priorities of the different SADC decision-makers are not unified. This limits the 
possibilities for harmonization of the “tools of statecraft”, which would create a better outset 
for further regional integration and coordination of issues ranging from democracy promotion 
to conflict resolution (van Nieuwkerk 2014: 65-66). In post-colonial Africa, patronage has 
been the system preferred by the governments for distribution of state resources. The inherited 
modern states and the liberal democratic institutions became moulded to fit the ruling elites 
personal interests, effectively “patrimonializing” the whole of the state system (Thomson 
2004: 108). Patrimonialism is a political order where a small elite or one individual ruler have 
power concentrated around their personal authority. Positions in public office are distributed 
to the ruler’s close associates, who then have to maintain loyalty in order to keep their job 
(ibid. 2004: 116). In a state characterized by personal rule, presidentialism and patronage, the 
legitimacy of the ruling classes is not always a reflection of the interest of the public and civil 
sector. Rather, the regime’s domination are often expressed through the distribution of 
material resources being limited to the regime’s supporters, and threats and use of violence 
against any opposition movements. This description applies to many of the states in the 
Southern African region (Taylor 2011: 1242). One incentive for regionalism reflects the 
member states’ wish to be recognized as legitimate states. A “nominal” regionalism is a tool 
for African states to underline their legitimacy and sovereignty. As regionalism presupposes 
the formality of state sovereignty, it is used as a symbol confirms said legitimacy. In the case 
of Southern Africa, regional integration lends credibility and support to neo-patrimonial states. 
Promotion of democracy, shared sovereignty and different paths than clientalism is not 
wanted by the neo-patrimonial states. Hence, ascribing to regional integration platforms 
cannot always be seen as positive for the spreading of “good governance”, civil liberties and 
democratic practices (Gibb 2009: 714). As an example, SADC has been criticized for being 
silent at times when Zambia and Zimbabwe have infringed on civil liberties and human rights 
19 
 
(Tavares 2010: 64). Swaziland, similar to Zimbabwe, is proof that undemocratic states have 
less reason to take an interest in deeper regional cooperation, especially political integration. 
If a country like Swaziland was to take part in further political integration, it could reveal the 
undemocratic political system and shed light on the patronage system enjoyed by King 
Mswati and his cronies (Welz 2013: 62-63). While political leaders appear to speak for their 
country in international forums and trade negotiations, this is not always the case. Many 
African state managers continue to pose as “representatives of the people”. This in order to 
attract and win preferential trade agreements and of course foreign aid from the rest of the 
world (Thomson 2004: 213). An additional detrimental factor to successful regional 
integration in Southern Africa is economic disparity. The lack of economic complementarity 
between the SADC member states can explain the limited impact that regionalism has had on 
the promotion of trade and development in the Southern African region (Gibb 2009: 712). In 
Southern Africa, what has been described as an “insecurity complex” is an unfortunate match 
with a laissez-faire, or market, regional economic integration. Unequal rates of growth and 
asymmetric economic development contribute to regional insecurity because economic 
disparities can generate or exacerbate security threats within the region (Hentz 2009: 190, 
213). 
 
The states who are close to and share a border with South Africa, such as Namibia, Zimbabwe, 
Botswana, Mozambique, Lesotho and Swaziland, are still influenced by the regional hegemon 
both in economic and political terms, albeit in a different way than under apartheid South 
Africa. The BLNS6 states together with South Africa make up the SACU members, and the 
evolvement of this old customs union has created closer economic ties between the five 
countries. To follow the regional logic of te Velde and Bezemer (2006), states such as Malawi, 
Zambia and Tanzania are situated more towards the regional periphery. As they are located 
further away from South Africa they are not influenced by the regional hegemon to the same 
extent. The Seychelles are a case in point of centre-periphery dynamics within SADC. The 
small island country left SADC in 2003 because of an unwillingness to contribute monetarily 
to regional efforts. The Seychelles re-joined in 2007, explained by a want to be more active in 
international relations.7 This took place without the rest of the region being affected in any 
special way. Tanzania has a more historically important and active role in the East African 
                                                             
6 Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland. 
7 SADC Today (2006). “Seychelles will apply to rejoin SADC”. Retrieved 01.06.2014, available at 
http://www.sardc.net/editorial/sadctoday/view.asp?vol=307&pubno=v8n6 
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Community. It is apparent that South Africa focuses more on its closer neighbours in terms of 
economic and political cooperation, with the DR Congo being one notable exception, 
explained by economic interests in the large country’s vast natural resources (Taylor 2011). 
Still, the unwillingness of SADC and the regional hegemon South Africa to interfere with 
Zimbabwean affairs displays an understanding of and respect for state sovereignty and a sense 
of shared history. This consequently creates an unwillingness to put into effect the tools a 
regional organization can utilize in order to work towards political stability and economic 
prosperity in the region. In addition, Zimbabwe’s behaviour in dealing with the SADC 
Tribunal is clear evidence of a member state’s unwillingness to cede sovereignty to a regional 
legal organ. From 2000 onwards, Zimbabwe emphasized a policy of patronage aimed at 
expropriating farms and land from the country’s white farmers. This expropriation of 
privately owned farms in effect caused many farmers to lose their farmlands to ZANU-PF 
affiliates. The legality of these policies was brought up in the SADC Tribunal, especially in 
the case of Campbell and Others v Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean authorities repeatedly 
protested any interference from the Tribunal. The suspension of the Tribunal following its 
ineffectiveness and non-acceptance among SADC member states is an illustrative indication 
of failed regional integration, particularly within the realm of legal agreements and regional 
dispute settlements (de Wet 2013: 51-53). The suspension of the SADC Tribunal in 2010 
following Zimbabwe's non-compliance with its orders created an impression that SADC 
member states are not committed to regional integration under the backing of the organization 
(Saurombe 2012: 25). The legal cooperation established with the SADC Tribunal assumed a 
willingness of the member states to share sovereignty within the rule of law. The Tribunal 
could have been a regional institution safeguarding against expropriations and breaches of 
contract. The suspension effectively truncated the principle organ for regional dispute 
settlements in southern Africa. A legal framework for future dispute settlements within the 
SADC is gravely undermined (de Wet 2013: 59). Further challenges for the analysis of 
decision-making within the SADC region and the organization include these current trends: 
The economic downturn of the West and its ongoing concerns over global terrorism, a rising 
East and a renewed global interest in Africa’s minerals and natural resources (van Nieuwkerk 
2014: 64). In the current international climate, cooperation in the SADC region is subject to 
developments in the international context where the member states face additional challenges 
for keeping their sovereignty, especially within questions of economy, but also within 
concerns over peace and security. 
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Regional economic cooperation 
In the 1980’s and early 1990’s, many of the countries in the SADC region were still finding 
their way out of the legacies of colonization. The economic policies had a strong focus on 
socialism and command economies, paired with import substitution and protectionism. This 
was a major cause of low FDI inflows in the period. During the 1990’s, SADC states began to 
adopt more liberal economic policies. An increase in FDI to the SADC member states during 
the latter part of the 1990’s is attributed to policies of liberalization and privatization being 
implemented in many countries at the time (Kubny et. al. 2011: 23). To expand on this 
important note: Investment-promotion agencies, de-regularization, privatization, market-
friendly policies, political stability and participation in multilateral and bilateral trade and 
investment agreements are among the factors which led to an increase in FDI flows to the 
region in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s (Mahembe and Odihambo 2013: 43). Regarding the 
location of FDI in southern Africa in the period 1996-2008, natural resources and the potential 
for exploitation highly attracted FDI. Openness to trade, a larger market size, agglomeration 
and the rule of law affected the inflow of FDI in a positive direction (Anyanwu 2012: 450-
451). Membership in SADC significantly increased the bilateral intra-state trade in the region 
during the years 1995-2006 (Afesorgbor and van Bergeijk 2011). The increase in intra-
regional trade between SADC member states have led to an increase in FDI to the region 
(Bezuidenhout and Naudé 2008: 2). Regional economic cooperation increases the market size 
in African regions. Given the small size of some domestic African markets, this is an 
important implication for future policy-making. Governance, institutional quality and the rule 
of law are conditions that both attract FDI to Africa and create better conditions for domestic 
multinationals to grow and possibly invest abroad. NEPAD8, the African Development Bank 
and regional economic communities can take responsibility for steering the continent more 
towards this type of development (Anyanwu 2012: 451). The priorities of NEPAD are 
building institutional capacities for peace and security, economic and corporate governance, 
infrastructure and communication technologies, central bank and financial standards and 
agriculture and market access. Through NEPAD, African leaders have agreed to effectively 
“police” themselves and other leaders. One of the goals is to attract investment capital to the 
priority areas by promoting better governance (Thomson 2004, Karns and Mingst 2010: 389). 
                                                             
8 The New Partnership for African Development. 
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This includes cooperation with regional organs such as SADC. Many of the SADC member 
states have signed a number of investment protection treaties with partner states in the 
industrialized world. As most of the SADC states are also members of MIGA9, foreign direct 
investment in the region can be insured against political risks such as expropriation and 
breaches of contract (Mbuende 2014: 249). Meanwhile, an indication of SADC’s 
ineffectiveness due to national interests is negotiations with trading blocks and partners from 
other parts of the world. SADC has attempted to establish itself as a trading block in 
negotiations with foreign partners, an important one being the EU. The SADC Economic 
Partnership agreements have included years of negotiations with the EU and other foreign 
partners. Also here, domestic politics and various interest groups have trumped regional goals 
and concerns, especially at the very end of a round of negotiations. There are three main 
obstacles to SADC’s collective foreign policy making: the region’s integration agenda has 
weak foundations, the national economies of the member states are different in nature and size, 
and the region has not yet shaken off old tensions and mistrust. This last point is related 
particularly to South Africa’s regional hegemony and how this is perceived differently in the 
neighbouring states (van Nieuwkerk 2014: 63). 
 
External tariffs have been reduced as part of SADC’s free market approach and trade 
liberalization (Karns and Mingst 2010: 209-210). Especially in a discussion of economics, 
trade and tariffs within the region, a few words on the double or multiple memberships in 
regional organizations are in order. Both SADC and South Africa itself have stated that 
membership in COMESA is incompatible with membership in SADC. Member states have 
been told to secede from COMESA. One result of this is that COMESA does not significantly 
influence the intra-regional trade in Southern Africa (Warin et al. 2009 in Afesorgbor and van 
Bergeijk 2011: 11). Still, trade within the SADC region is low, at around 6 percent of total 
trade (Karns and Mingst 2010: 210). The FDI inflow into the SADC region increased from 
US$372 million in 1980 to US$17 billion in 2008, when the global financial crises also 
affected Southern Africa. The FDI inflows to SADC went down to US$7 billion in 2010, 
while 2011 saw the numbers increase to US$10 billion (UNCTAD 2013). Increased openness 
within the SADC region is viewed as beneficial towards attracting FDI (Lederman et. al. 2013: 
3647).Various public policies and strategies for opening up the region for foreign investments 
have been undertaken by SADC member states over the course of the last twenty years. While 
                                                             
9 Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, World Bank Group. 
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regional trade agreements has provided the region with a larger, more open and competitive 
market, the agreements are not always region-wide. Bilateral and multilateral subsets have 
helped attract both domestic and foreign investments (Mbuende 2014: 245-246).Within the 
region, the best performers when it comes to creating an attractive environment for business 
and foreign investments are Mauritius, South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and the 
Seychelles (Darley 2012).  In addition, the SADC economies did see improvements in GDP 
growth rate during the late 1990’s and early 2000’s. Some of the reasons for this growth in 
GDP are dividends associated with a higher degree of regional peace, an increase in the oil 
output in Angola, and an improved management of macroeconomic policies in most of the 
sub-regional economies (Buthelezi 2006: 163-164). Mozambique was able to attract an 
increase in FDI during the 1990’s because of successful structural changes and fiscal policies 
(Basu and Srinivasan 2002: 35). Mozambique is likely to continue its economic growth and 
political progress. The country could turn into a complementary trading partner and even a 
substantial competitor for South Africa in the region (Kraxberger and McClaughry 2013: 23). 
Southern Africa benefits from functioning regional integration and cooperation. SADC has 
implemented several functional projects among member states and other neighbouring 
countries, including transport and infrastructure, management of shared resources and 
hydroelectric power projects (Karns and Mingst 2010: 210, Mbuende 2014: 250-251). In 
terms of attracting FDI, expanding and upgrading infrastructure for the extraction and 
transport of natural resources is beneficial to all member states involved. Positive 
developments linked to the effects of regional integration are here identified. Cooperation in 
building infrastructure, sound fiscal policies with an aim to attract FDI, and a generally more 
peaceful and stable region are pointers towards a more attractive climate for foreign 
investment. Viewing the developments through the eyes of a potential foreign investor, the 
economic policies in many of the member states are more attractive today than they were 
twenty years ago, although neither country within the region is free of political risk. Once 
again, Zimbabwe provides an example of economic policies that are bound to deter foreign 
investors. In Zimbabwe, distinct policies of economic empowerment has become widespread 
and seen as a way to support patronage and clientalism in the distribution of scarce resources 
and goods. The economic uncertainties partly worsened by these policies are damaging to 
how the country is perceived for potential investments. With the example of foreign 
investments in the mining sector, weak state policy-making and badly functioning regulatory 
institutions has created a high risk political and economic environment which in effect deters 
investments (Magure 2012: 79-80). Currently, the region is still facing several constraints to 
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FDI inflows. These include uncertainty about policies, political instability, poor infrastructure 
and various degrees of difficulty in doing business (Mahembe and Odihambo 2013: 43). 
Regional economic cooperation is still an important suggested strategy for increasing the 
share of foreign direct investment into Southern Africa. A further expansion of regional 
trading arrangements, a common approach to changing negative perceptions of the region and 
working towards reducing corruption are areas of priority for African countries and regional 
organizations aiming for increased inflow of FDI (Darley 2012). The increased market size 
and trade liberalization within the SADC region has had a positive effect on parts of the 
political risk associated with FDI. Infrastructure and resource management across borders are 
positive factors for an increase in FDI. Here, SADC has contributed to a better climate for 
FDI, giving credibility to H1. Challenges remain in terms of weak and disruptive states, such 
as Zimbabwe and the DR Congo, and the lack of or delayed subscription to SADC policies by 
all member states. 
 
Regional peace and security cooperation 
“There must also be an appreciation that military matters and decisions are not matters that 
are discussed in public, other than to share broader policy.” - Jacob Zuma10 
 
An extremely brief summary of the region’s history in the 1970’s and 1980’s is in order to 
provide some background for the evolution of the security agenda in southern Africa. During 
these years, great power politics and external actors greatly influenced the peace and security 
realm. This contributed to further destabilization in the region through a worsening and 
prolongation of conflicts related to liberation movements, often taking the form of proxy wars. 
Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and South Africa were battlegrounds for armed struggles 
between the ruling powers and liberation movements, and proxy arenas for the Cold War 
conflict between the East and the West (Thomson 2004: 153). Although the fight against 
apartheid regimes and the remnants of colonialism resulted in a significant alteration of 
regional priorities and policies after 1994, security thinking in the region is still shaped and 
influenced by a historic narrative, linked to liberation struggles and the decolonization project 
(van Nieuwkerk 2014: 64). Over the last ten years, «African solutions to African problems» 
                                                             
10 Jacob Zuma, 2013 “Message of Condolences by the Commander in Chief of the South African National 
Defence Force and President of the Republic of South Africa, at the Memorial Service of the SANDF Member 
Who Died in the Central African Republic, Airforce Base, Tshwane,” http://www.info.gov.za/speech. 
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has been the maxim of the African Union. In relation to peace and security, the maxim is 
embodied in the APSA11, showing a wish for African sub-regional institutions and local 
governments to get increased control over conflict management in Africa (Nathan 2013: 1, 5). 
The foreign relations within SADC are related to two main themes; resolution of conflict and 
issues linked to trade and economy. During SADC’s existence, the region has not seen just 
peace and economic prosperity. New violent inter- and intra-state conflicts appeared, while 
older conflicts deepened. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a major war broke out in 
the late 1990’s. Political tension and mismanagement was followed by violent conflict in 
Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Madagascar. SADC was involved in various forms of conflict 
resolution in the aforementioned countries. If strengthening the economic integration and 
trade relations were not a great enough challenge for the organization already, these conflicts 
drew resources and attention further away from economic progress, at the same time causing 
instability not only within the countries, but for neighbouring states and effectively large parts 
of the Southern African region (van Nieuwkerk 2014: 61). Political instability hampered the 
regional integration efforts in Southern Africa. The situations in Lesotho, the DR Congo 
Angola, Madagascar and Zimbabwe marred the early 1990’s optimism about the region’s 
future (Mbuende 2014: 250-251). Conflict resolution and working towards regional peace and 
stability is expressed within SADC’s treaties. It is also logical that the regional institution 
should take the lead in mediating a conflict that is taking place in its own “backyard”. SADC 
has security mechanisms that were established before the reformation of the African Union in 
2002, and by this could have a higher degree of experience and expertise in its own region 
(Ancas 2011: 133, 138). The focus on local solutions follows the international tendency of 
regional bodies taking the lead in peace and security efforts within their own region. After the 
Cold War, the UN has championed this, on the basis that regional bodies are more familiar 
with the regional conflict dynamics and in most cases have an interest in keeping the peace in 
the organizations’ own geographical area (Nathan 2013: 1). On the other hand, SADC has 
been accused of non-intervention after prolonged or failed responses when a member state has 
violates democratic principles. This is largely because the development of a democratic 
identity is linked to successful economic integration (Van der Vleuten and Hoofman 2010: 
739). Another obstacle to effective peace-making in Africa has been the “competitive peace-
making” or “crowdedness”, often arising from a pressurised and unregulated environment. 
When mediators have to act in parallel with or against another state, multilateral and non-state 
                                                             
11 African Peace and Security Architecture. 
26 
 
actors, the peace-making process becomes obtruded and often ineffective. This has been the 
case for SADC especially in Zimbabwe, the DR Congo and Madagascar (Ancas 2011: 140). 
In theory, the common agreements and political-economic framework of SADC should cause 
the organization to intervene or explicitly attempt to correct a state that does not follow the 
organization’s policies and obligations, or otherwise disrupts the economic and political 
stability in the region. As will be shown, the types of intervention identified here might not 
always be stemming from the interests or policies of SADC as a united regional actor, or any 
emphasis on the “common good”, but rather of one or more member states using the SADC 
“banner” in their own interest (Ancas 2011, Tavares 2011). Further, the reasons for lack of 
successful regional integration and increased cooperation will be explained, drawing on both 
positive and negative critiques of SADC and the region’s development over the last twenty 
years. The case studies do not establish a direct link between involvement from the regional 
organization and lowered political risk. Rather, they are illustrative of the challenges facing 
cooperation and common goals within Southern Africa, and of the countries interaction with 
SADC and occasionally South Africa. 
 
The civil war in Angola took place between 1974 and 2002, with the government of Angola 
engaging the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The UN 
imposed various sanctions in an attempt to end the fighting. Among the UN’s efforts were 
travel and aviation bans, arms embargos and oil sanctions, together with diplomatic sanctions 
such as closing UNITA offices around the world. SADC aided the UN’s sanctions against 
UNITA by blocking exports of diamonds from Angola and monitoring air traffic, steps that 
helped block arms and fuel to UNITA (Karns and Mingst 2010: 320). UNITA was supported 
by structures in the DR Congo, Zambia and Namibia, while the air traffic control centre used 
by SADC to monitor illegal flights were situated in South Africa (Power 2001: 496). In 2002, 
UNITA’s leader died, and together with the effects of the various sanctions, this led the 
conflict to an end (Karns and Mingst 2010: 321). While SADC contributed to limiting flights 
to UNITA-controlled territories, the organization at the time was accused of being incoherent 
and ineffective in its responses to the ongoing civil war in Angola. During the latter part of 
the civil war, there was still little regional consensus to be found among SADC member states 
about how to coordinate efforts to end the conflict (Power 2001: 490). 
Lesotho also faced an intervention under the SADC banner in 1998. After elections 
that year, allegations that the results were rigged led to violent protests and riots. South Africa, 
Botswana and Zimbabwe established the Langa Comission, which concluded that the 
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elections were not free and fair. The Lesotho Defence Force launched a mutiny against the 
government of Lesotho. The coup had a destabilizing effect on the small country (van 
Nieuwkerk 2014: 54). Premier Mosisili requested an intervention and South Africa and 
Botswana sent troops to Lesotho (Gebrewold 2014: 13). Both South Africa and Botswana 
wanted to avoid spill-over effects such as refugees and the possible spread of turmoil from 
Lesotho into neighbouring states (Tavares 2011: 159). The troops from Botswana and South 
Africa were deployed to Lesotho under SADC auspices and leadership. The intervention has 
been described as “brief, but bloody”. Relative political stability was restored after subsequent 
constitutional reforms (CIA 2014b).  
The DR Congo has been a country ravaged by civil wars and involvement on troops 
from other African countries since independence in 1960 (Karns and Mingst 2010). Despite 
being an unstable country, the DR Congo was admitted into SADC in 1997. One explanation 
for this is South Africa’s interests in the country’s business potential, specifically within 
mining and to a lesser extent, the country’s potential for hydropower (Taylor 2011: 1238).  A 
massive inflow of refugees fleeing fighting in Rwanda and Burundi around 1994 led to ethnic 
strife and civil war in the DR Congo. In 1997, with the backing of Rwanda and Uganda, long-
time president Mobutu’s regime was toppled in a rebellion led by Laurent Kabila. In august 
1998, Kabila’s new regime was challenged by a new insurrection, once again backed by 
Uganda and Rwanda (CIA 2014c). Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe undertook a joint military 
intervention in order to protect Kabila’s regime. This intervention was strongly disputed in 
SADC leader summits, with the SADC chairperson Nelson Mandela calling for dialogue and 
negotiation, while on the other side Robert Mugabe claimed that SADC was unanimously 
supporting Kabila and defended the military intervention based on collective self-defence. 
SADC called for an immediate cease-fire and recognized the legitimacy of Kabila’s regime, 
but the intervention went on. The intervention was recognized by SADC retroactively 
(Tavares 2011). SADC was not highly concerned with maintaining leadership in 
implementing and consolidating the peace initiatives that were brokered mainly by South 
Africa. This responsibility was largely given to the UN. In the DR Congo, the UN attempted 
to harness the advantages of closer cooperation with regional actors such as the AU and 
SADC. Both organizations largely withdrew from managing the conflict. This is explained by 
an unwillingness to commit to long-term involvement and providing resources to the process. 
The early intervention undertaken by SADC is seen as having tainted the organization’s 
credibility and reputation, especially as a reliable partner for the UN in the management of 
future regional issues (Ancas 2011: 146). 
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During the last twenty years, Zimbabwe has been one of the countries in the region 
with lacking policy consistency and transparency (Mlambo 2005: 563). Hence, Zimbabwe 
disrupts the economic and political stability within the region (Gibb 2007, Bezuidenhout and 
Naudé 2008, Amos 2010). During the time of elections in 2005 and 2008, politically 
motivated violence reached its peak. Operations were undertaken to intimidate supporters of 
the new party Movement for Democratic Change, and there were reports of injuries and 
killings during both election periods (Welz 2013: 30). At this time, SADC was at the centre of 
controversies over how to deal with the political, economic and health crises in Zimbabwe 
(Karns and Mingst 2010: 210). Contrary to demands from external actors for SADC to 
intervene in Zimbabwe, the SADC Heads of State were in agreement that Zimbabwe’s 
sovereignty was of a higher importance than the calls to step up the external intervention 
(Ancas 2011: 145). A paradox within SADC’s actions is here clearly illustrated; the 
organization’s own guidelines against unconstitutional changes of government was of less 
importance than the “old” adherence to national sovereignty and the lingering effects of a 
shared historical solidarity. 
On Madagascar, the conflict forming the background for a coup in 2009 had roots 
back to the presidential election in 2001. The two presidential candidates Ratsiraka and 
Ravalomanana each had support from nearly half the country. Ravalomanana won the election 
in 2001, and continued his tenure after the election in 2006. Protests against restrictions on the 
opposition’s activities and press made Ravalomanana step down and give the power to the 
military. The military handed the presidency to Andry Rajoleina, in what effectively was a 
coup d’état. SADC stepped in as a mediator (CIA 2014a). South Africa wanted a joint SADC 
to take leadership in mediation efforts, while other parties, including France, urged Jacob 
Zuma to take the lead. The international attempt at mediation gave grounds for a more 
nationally oriented solution to the conflict, but this solution failed in establishing a plan that 
was acceptable for all parties involved. SADC once again attempted to organize a successful 
and fair election in Madagascar (Ancas 2011: 144). During the crisis in Madagascar, the 
senior SADC decision makers at one point called for military intervention. Madagascar’s 
SADC membership was suspended from 2009 to January 2014 (van Nieuwkerk 2014: 65). 
With support from the UN, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in 2013 (CIA 
2014a). 
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SADC’s involvement as a conflict mediator in the DR Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar and 
Zimbabwe are neither stories of clear successes. The actions taken by SADC are described as 
procrastinations and unfulfilled commitments. Although SADC has the capacity and 
frameworks to effectively attempt to intervene in regional conflicts, the lack of political will 
at high levels affects policy decisions and leads to a “nascent security community” (Taylor 
2014: 137). The attempts at regional peace-making involving SADC have had limited success, 
due to a strong dedication of African leaders to uphold their respect for national sovereignty. 
Sub-regional peace-making has focused on stopping ongoing and potential violence, with a 
lesser attention to the underlying problems concerning governance and creation of plans to 
ensure stability in the long term. Cases in point are the regional peace-making efforts in 
Madagascar, Zimbabwe and DR Congo (Ancas 2011: 147-148). Within the organization itself, 
only 30-40 percent of the around 200 SADC employees have peace and security issues as 
their specific area of work (Tavares 2010: 64). Former ambassadors and state defence chiefs 
have lamented both the lack of a clear direction in SADC peace and security policies, and also 
proper accounts of the military dimensions that guided regional interventions, examples being 
Lesotho and the DR Congo in 1998 (van Nieuwkerk 2014: 60). The actions taken by SADC 
have not been agreed upon by all member states. For example, the crises in Zimbabwe divided 
SADC members. Angola, South Africa, the DR Congo and Namibia were supportive of 
Mugabe, while only Zambia and Botswana were critical voices. The handling of Zimbabwe 
and Mugabe is also illustrative of South Africa’s weak position as a regional leader. While 
South Africa arrested thousands of Zimbabweans fleeing from Mugabe’s authoritative regime, 
little was done in order to stop the crisis (Gebrewold 2014: 14). SADC is still the key regional 
institution in the Southern African region, while the AU also has a level of influence over the 
continent’s regional organizations. Through the continent-wide cooperation with APSA, the 
AU is working with its sub-regional partners, including SADC, to find common norms and 
approaches to peace and security issues (Tjønneland 2014: 3). Van Nieuwkerk (2014) 
concludes that SADC is a “stable, but not always efficient” organization. The framework for 
regional cooperation has not always been effective in practical situations. One example of this 
is the delayed implementation of a revised Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO II), 
formally presented and launched by SADC in 2012. The extent of domestic acceptance for 
SIPO II will indicate which status SADC’s strategic culture has in the fifteen member states 
(ibid. 2014: 64). The lack of agreement within over when, how and why a regional 
intervention is to take place gives reduced support for both H1 and H2. SADC has not acted 
as a strong, joint regional force working for peace and stability in the region, but rather as a 
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scene for displaying the different preference and attitudes between the member states. Actual 
military interventions have often been the wish of only two or three member states. Hence, 
SADC’s behaviour as a regional actor is not strong enough to be given a primary explanatory 
function for the relative increase in peace and stability in the region. 
 
 
South Africa –   a dominant or reluctant regional hegemon? 
“We are prepared, too, to shoulder our share of the responsibility for the whole southern 
African region, not in the spirit of paternalism or dominance but mutual cooperation and 
respect.” (Mandela 1993: 97) 
“It is not an exaggeration to say that were it not for South Africa's interference on the wrong 
side, our nation might not have ended in this mess.” Tanonoka Joseph Whande, 201412 
 
The role of South Africa in the region is crucial to understanding the political and economic 
development in Southern Africa over the last twenty years. South Africa under apartheid 
engaged in destabilization policies that contributed to conflict on the continent (Thomson 
2004: 152). The situation after the fall of apartheid was different; South Africa held its first 
democratic election in 1994 and was included into SADC. The regional hegemon changed 
shape from one of a regional pariah state exercising economic and military policies aimed at 
destabilization into a regional power taking the lead in future integration efforts, mainly 
through SADC. Given its geographical location at the southernmost tip of Africa, one could 
argue that South Africa is relatively more insulated from conflict and instability on the 
continent than for example the DR Congo. Still, since South Africa has the most advanced 
and semi-industrialized economy in Africa, it is logical that the ANC governments have 
attempted to create a coherent agenda in the Southern African region (Kraxberger and 
McClaughry 2013: 22). After 1994, South Africa undertook changes in fiscal policies and 
liberalized its domestic markets. Privatization, liberalization and joining the WTO, TRIPS and 
TRIMS13 agreements had a significant effect on South Africa’s FDI inflow from non-African 
                                                             
12 SW Radio Africa, 05.05.14: “Zimbabwe: When Baboons Are Called Upon to Protect the Maize Fields”. 
Available at http://allafrica.com/stories/201405070234.html?viewall=1 
13 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Agreement on Trade Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMS), (WTO 2014). 
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countries. The effect of increased trust in the biggest player in the region had advantageous 
effects on the FDI attractiveness of the whole Southern African region (Kubny et. al. 2011: 
20). An important development during these last decades is the increase in FDI from South 
Africa into its neighbouring countries. Since 1994, when South Africa returned to democracy, 
the flow of FDI from South Africa has increased throughout the whole of the African 
continent (Cleeve 2008: 140). South Africa’s tight economic relations with the rest of the 
SADC region can be illustrated by numbers; 90 per cent of the country’s trade with the rest of 
Africa being concentrated within the SADC region. South African investments in Africa are 
heavily dominated by capital flowing to the rest of the SADC region (Tjønneland 2014: 2). At 
the same time as South Africa has expanded its business interests in the whole region the 
country has attempted to emphasize its diplomatic functions. These are the main expressions 
of South African hegemony in Southern Africa (Alden and Soko 2005: 368). The admission 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo into SADC was explained as another political 
implication of South Africa’s continuing wish to expand its business interests throughout the 
region, with regional economic integration assisting South Africa in spreading their capital 
and goods to the rest of Southern Africa (Taylor 2011: 1237-1238). Similarly to other foreign 
companies operating in Africa in terms of pursuing their own commercial agendas, the role 
and behaviour of South African companies in other African countries could contribute to 
reputational risks for South African government policies (Tjønneland 2014: 5). Some positive 
results can be linked to the hegemon expanding its business to neighbouring countries. The 
increase in South African trade and investment in Mozambique is one factor contributing to a 
double-digit growth in the country’s GDP, and also improved Human Development Indices in 
the province surrounding the capitol, Maputo (Alden and Soko 2005: 376). Meanwhile, 
Lesotho is seeing both benefits and challenges arising from its close economic ties with South 
Africa. The monetary union creates stable interest rates and a credible monetary policy on the 
one hand, but also makes the small country subject to currency volatility vis-à-vis the rest of 
the global economy. Because South Africa is more developed and has larger and more 
attractive business prospects, Lesotho’s own FDI initiatives are facing tough competition 
from its dominant neighbour (Mahembe and Odihambo 2013: 39).  
 
South Africa’s extensive engagement in peace-making on the continent can be explained by 
several factors. The country’s large economic and military resources makes it capable of 
taking on the role of a leader in many situations. Furthermore, South Africa wishes to promote 
good governance and stability in its own region, linked to a goal of sustained development, 
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increased investments and economic growth. Also, South Africa’s history of destabilizing 
policies under the apartheid regime gives it a sense of moral obligation to contribute to 
stability and economic prosperity not only in its own country, but also in the immediate 
region and the continent as a whole (Nathan 2013: 3). Through SADC, South Africa has tried 
to influence the other states in the region into restructuring themselves in order to 
“consolidate, defend and maintain democracy, peace, security and stability”. South Africa 
wishes to discipline the region by making the member states reinvent themselves as 
“competition states” in an effort to attract capital, both from abroad and from South Africa. 
This should in effect have made the states in the region better competitors for winning 
investment, possibly also attracting investments which may otherwise have gone to rival 
territories (Taylor 2011: 1239). The motivation behind South Africa’s 1998 military 
involvement in Lesotho was not seen only as a humanitarian peace-keeping mission, which 
was the official statement. South Africa also justified the intervention’s legality by arguing 
that it took place under SADC auspices and the organization not permitting coups d’état and 
similar unconstitutional changes in Southern Africa (Tavares 2011: 158). The motivation for 
stabilizing Lesotho was also about strategic resources, especially water, and expanding the 
regional hegemon’s sphere of influence (Gebrewold 2014: 13). Meanwhile, South Africa 
today also face its own constraints to its international competitiveness and ability to attract 
foreign investment. Poor security ( = high crime rates), high business costs and a lack of 
efficiency in the labour market together with a general shortage of skills and the often 
troubling health conditions of the country’s workforce are areas South Africa should address 
in order to be more attractive for investment (Mahembe and Odihambo 2013: 40). An 
underdeveloped, poorly located and insufficient infrastructure, a lower quality of education, 
widespread corruption and a lack of diversification in a highly resource-dependent economy 
are also economic challenges in South Africa (Government of South Africa 2011). A brief 
overview of a recent analysis of the political risk in South Africa gives an indication why the 
country remains in the “medium-risk” category. The social and political-economic variables 
such as a high level of unemployment, low levels of education and unschooled labour can 
have its effect on investor confidence. Violent protests have also increased in numbers in the 
period 2005-2013. While the threat of war, revolution, hostile neighbours and military 
involvement is low in South Africa, factors such as corruption, inefficiency in government, 
inflexible labour policies and policy uncertainty linked to the mining industry and agriculture 
are indicators to be considered by foreign investors (Neethling 2014: 52). While mining is still 
the engine of the South African economy, an increase in labour unrest within this industry is 
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troubling for continuing foreign investment. South Africa, in cooperation with Chinese 
companies, remain the largest actor when it comes to tapping resources from other Southern 
African countries, notably Zambia and the DR Congo (Laudicina et. al. 2013: 22). 
 
 
Within the SADC region, South Africa prioritizes security in order to ensure prosperity and 
further development. This is one reason why South Africa has wanted to be involved in 
efforts to mitigate the crises in Zimbabwe (Welz 2013: 134). South Africa has often taken the 
lead in the development of security frameworks both for Africa in general and the SADC 
region in particular. Through APSA and the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security 
Cooperation, South Africa has been instrumental in the policy documents and instruments 
laying the foundations for a strengthening of peace and security cooperation, both within 
SADC and the continent as a whole (Tjønneland 2014: 2). Although South Africa shows an 
interest in working with the UN, AU and SADC, the country does not wish to surrender its 
sovereignty and self-determination. Under the current president, Jacob Zuma, South Africa’s 
foreign policy has taken a pragmatic turn, focusing on deeper involvement with the BRIC14 
countries and the G8. This in effect means a reduced interest in economic cooperation with 
neighbouring and fellow African states (Welz 2013: 135). While South Africa is a large 
investor in the rest of the region, the country’s political influence and normative leadership 
over the neighbouring countries is highly constrained (Taylor 2011: 1237). Being conscious 
of its history of apartheid, which, arguably is not yet far away in time, South Africa has been 
reluctant on imposing pressure on other African governments. In the build-up to potential 
interventions, South Africa has sought to find an “African consensus”. This is evident within 
Southern Africa, for example in the case of South African diplomacy related to the crises in 
Zimbabwe (Tjønneland 2014: 5). Also in Swaziland, there have been reports of violations of 
human rights and suppression of protests voicing people’s want for democracy. Zuma and 
South Africa remained silent on this issue (Gebrewold 2014: 17). As in other SADC member 
states, further regional integration is hampered by South Africa’s recurring reluctance to share 
sovereignty. The unwillingness to yield sovereignty is linked to South Africa’s history. The 
legacy of the liberation struggle which led to the establishment of a democratic order in the 
early 1990’s is still alive in South African politics, where up until the present day all 
democratically elected presidents have come from the ANC. Several developments have cast 
                                                             
14 Brazil, Russia, India and China. 
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doubt over whether South Africa actually wants deeper and more far-reaching integration 
through the AU or even SADC (Kraxberger and McClaughry 2013: 22). Although the 
country’s leadership emphasized cooperation between African states since the time of 
liberation, South Africa does not view the AU as a federation or union of states, but rather as 
an intergovernmental organization (Welz 2013: 135-136). Pragmatic policies have taken 
precedence over a greater support of democratization and human rights. South Africa’s 
authority within the region is not projected through exemplarity, and thus compromises the 
hegemon’s role as a regional leader (Gebrewold 2014: 18). In relation to the sense of African 
unity and respect for other governments, South Africa’s “quiet diplomacy” and mediation 
efforts in dealing with the various crises in Zimbabwe around 2007-2008 have been viewed as 
being in favour of the government (Nathan 2013, Tjønneland 2014: 5). In terms of economic 
influence, South Africa often concentrates on states with which they share a border and a 
longer history of trade agreements. For South Africa, the economic cooperation and benefits 
achievable through SACU are of a higher importance than dealings with SADC (van 
Nieuwkerk 2014: 63). 
 
If South Africa’s role as a regional hegemon further entrenches economic disparities in the 
region, the dominance of one powerful state over its neighbours could have the unfortunate 
effect of contributing to inter- and intra-state conflicts. South Africa can be seen, in 
comparison with neighbouring countries, as a democratic state with the definite leading 
economy. South Africa’s investments in neighbouring countries have a positive influence on 
certain economic, social and political indicators, such as in Mozambique (Alden and Soko 
2005). The third hypothesis posited that South Africa was definitely the regional hegemon in 
terms of economic and political power, and thus constrained bad behaviour from other states 
in the region. South Africa still attempts to have an economic and political grip on the rest of 
the region, by investing in the other countries and aiming to take the leadership in diplomatic 
efforts, as well as influencing the other states in terms of spreading “good governance”, 
democracy and neo-liberal values. While some countries benefit from cooperation with South 
Africa and SADC, others continue to disrupt regional cooperation. Zimbabwe is viewed as the 
most disruptive element in the region, destabilizing both national and regional economic and 
political stability, especially during the last ten years (Bezuidenhout and Naudé 2008, Amos 
2010). Zimbabwe is highly dependent on South Africa and contributes very little to the 
regional market except for a few agricultural articles. Further integration within SADC, 
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especially in the common market, could have boosted Zimbabwe`s economy. During the 
currency crisis of 2006-2009, Zimbabwe did little to reach out for help from SADC, 
COMESA or the AU (Welz 2013: 32-33).  In comparison with South Africa, Botswana has 
been more vocal and open in its criticism of Mugabe’s regime. South Africa’s regional 
leadership is contested by its regional and international behaviour, by not demonstrating an 
exemplarity in taking a firm stance on issues such as Zimbabwe. More action from the 
regional hegemon could have pushed regional neighbours to in the direction of accepting 
South Africa’s regional leadership (Gebrewold 2014: 18). The relationship with Zimbabwe 
and Mugabe is a strong indication that South Africa’s interests are stretched between an 
expressed aspiration for regional stability and the policies of non-interference and respect for 
the national sovereignty of its neighbours. In terms of regional economic cooperation, South 
Africa prioritizes SACU/BLNS as a functioning customs union and an area for expanding its 
business and sphere of influence. The realist assumptions on regional hegemony does not 
fully explain South Africa’s role in the region. South Africa does use SADC to spread its 
values and ideas, but does not act as a paymaster. Especially the case of Zimbabwe seems to 
disprove H3. South Africa has not been effective in constraining bad behaviour from 
neighbouring states. Respecting another country’s sovereignty, however “badly governed” it 
may be, has hampered mediation efforts under the leadership of South Africa and SADC. As 
Taylor (2011) and Welz (2013) point out, this is linked to a shared history of struggle against 
white-minority regimes and the legacies of de-colonization, effectively overriding harder 
diplomatic lines that could have been beneficial to the general stability of the region. In effect, 
some call South Africa a “hesitant hegemon” (Tjønneland 2014:5). 
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Looking to the East 
“In most recent times, as the West started being hostile to us, we deliberately declared a Look 
East policy” - Robert Mugabe15 
 
A discussion of foreign investments into Africa in 2014 arguably needs to include a passage 
on China and give attention to other “rising powers” such as India and Brazil. The somewhat 
older literature on foreign investment into developing countries is based on Western countries’ 
behaviour and preferences, and it is possible that the perceptions of political risk as a whole 
vary in different parts of the world. In the 1950’s, China began to influence and strengthen 
ties with Africa in its own way. As an example, the building of the Tazara line running from 
Dar es Salaam to interior Zambia, was a project funded and undertaken by the Chinese 
government during the 1960’s and 1970’s (Thomson 2004: 154). China has been outspoken 
about the principle of “non-interference” when dealing with Africa, and the country invokes a 
“South-South solidarity” based on a shared history of unjust treatment and colonization by the 
West. China has massively increased its foreign direct investment in nearly all African 
countries over the last fifteen years. Efforts to contribute to the peace and security agenda in 
Africa includes UN peacekeeping troops and the Chinese-led training of soldiers from African 
countries (Tjønneland 2014: 3). With Chinese assistance, Zambia has divided itself up into 
special economic zones, in an effort to incentivize foreign investments and strengthen 
domestic firms and businesses (Alves 2012 in Mahembe and Odihambo 2013: 42). Although 
the rising powers’ increasing presence in Africa are heavily based on economic interests, they 
also wish to secure their investments and contribute to a more stable environment. This makes 
them gradually more influential in Africa’s peace and security agenda, albeit in different ways. 
Rising powers moving into Africa share South Africa’s concern over reputational risks linked 
to the interplay between foreign investments and government policies (Tjønneland 2014: 5). 
Regarding political risk, China might be less concerned with the institutional quality of the 
host country. More Chinese FDI flows to countries with large natural resources, while there is 
also a correlation between poor institutional environment and a higher inflow of FDI from 
China into the host country. If China regularly feeds into institutional and governmental 
dysfunctions in resource-rich African countries, this could be problematic from a 
                                                             
15 People Daily 26.10.06: “Interview: President Mugabe hails Zimbabwe-China ties”. Available at 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200610/27/eng20061027_315746.html. 
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developmental point of view (Kolstad and Wiig 2011: 31, 45). The non-African rising powers 
are increasingly engaging with Africa’s sub-regional organizations. As the foreign powers’ 
presence in the African economies grows larger, so does concerns over (in)security and 
(in)stability. The political risks are of importance for foreign investors; both in terms of 
protecting investments, but also in a consideration of their image in Africa. One illustration of 
this is China’s increasing presence in the DR Congo, where economic interests preceded a 
military presence, albeit through the auspices of UN peacekeeping efforts (Tjønneland 2014: 
6). 
 
 
Conclusion 
During its twenty years as the dominant regional organization in Southern Africa, the 
hypotheses H1 and H2, which implied SADC contributing to the lowering of perceived 
political risk for foreign direct investments in the region, are only partly true. While mediation 
efforts, diplomacy and military interventions in the long run can contribute to political and 
economic stability, the goals and implementation of deeper regional cooperation and 
integration have often been hampered by the member state’s own interests and unwillingness 
to share sovereignty. Another proof of this unwillingness to engage in further and deeper 
regional integration is the lack of a regional dimension in the national plans of SADC’s 
member states. There is a lack of prioritization when it comes to strategies, policies and 
cooperation linked to regional questions (Tavares 2010: 64). Taylor goes so far as to state that 
Southern Africa is effectively lacking hegemony, on the basis that patrimonialism has 
contributed to the devolution of power and fortification of the state’s own elites. With the lack 
of regional hegemony, despotism and unpredictability arises and continues, developments 
which creates trouble both for the stability of the regional project and for how capitalist 
development and subsequent investments can influence the region’s development (Taylor 
2011: 1242). This confirms the negative relationship between political instability and the 
ability to attract foreign investments. Delayed implementation of protocols, different views on 
regional security and a lack of willingness to cooperate in mediation efforts has had negative 
consequences for the organization’s effectiveness. Arguably, SADC must have learned from 
trials and errors in Lesotho, the DR Congo, Zimbabwe and Madagascar (van Nieuwkerk 2014: 
65). The SADC Tribunal could have been an illustrative example of SADC establishing a 
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common legal precedence throughout the region. However, the shortcomings and subsequent 
suspension of the Tribunal shows the difficulty in the implementation of a legal organ for 
regional dispute settlement (de Wet 2013). If the logic of SADC is to be “no development 
without stability”, the organization could benefit from a high degree of institutional 
refinement (van Nieuwkerk 2014: 54). During the period concerned, managing elections in 
the SADC region has been given increased attention by the organization and its member states. 
This prioritization is because of a realization that with election times comes a sharpening of 
political tensions (ibid. 2014: 61).For the benefit of the region’s stability SADC aims to work 
towards limiting the escalation of potential inter-state conflict, frequently intensified during 
the time of an election. With elections held in South Africa, Malawi, Mozambique, Botswana 
and Namibia during 2014, there is call for both SADC and AU to monitor the processes, as 
there are worries about the potential for conflict surrounding the elections (Mail and Guardian 
2014). The argument at the outset was that regional integration efforts are advantageous 
towards regional economic and political stability, which in turn will attract an increase in FDI. 
It was also argued that FDI is beneficial to the host countries. Concerning SADC, the last 
twenty years have seen several attempts at establishing regional legal, financial and political 
institutions and keeping the region peaceful and stable. The motivation for interventions and 
mediation efforts in the region varies, and SADC members rarely agree on further action and 
development. Furthermore, new treaties and agreements often fall victim to prolonged 
processes of implementation and a low degree of practical consequences. National interests 
have high explanatory value for how the member states perform in terms of attracting FDI. In 
Southern Africa, strong national interests and a prioritization of sovereignty are also 
disadvantageous to further regional cooperation. Meanwhile, regionalism in southern Africa 
cannot be discarded only as a tool for state leaders to legitimize their sovereignty and 
leadership. Although SADC is accused of being a slow and inefficient institution, the positive 
effects of regional integration can be seen in member states, which themselves have relative 
political stability and sound fiscal policies, among them macroeconomic policies directly 
aimed at attracting an increase in FDI. An overall stable country such as Botswana benefits 
from its membership in SADC and SACU, while an unstable country like Zimbabwe not only 
creates greater challenges for its own ability to attract FDI, but also disrupts the regional 
peace and the future of SADC. Therefore, there is clearly not enough evidence to support 
neither H1 nor H2. SADC has not been a coherent regional actor, and the transnational legal 
and political-economic frameworks are rarely followed up in practice. As the role of South 
Africa as a regional hegemon is disputed, the conclusion will be that the regional hegemon in 
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practice has not been effective in constraining “bad” and disruptive behaviour from 
neighbouring states, Zimbabwe being a strong example. Therefore, H3 has little support in the 
findings when looking at the whole region. 
 
For scholars such as Jensen (2008) and Jakobsen (2010), political risk it provides approaches 
for systematizing analyses of countries and sectors, and indicators of risks facing potential 
investments abroad. To update the quote from Benjamin Franklin; an investment in political 
knowledge will pay a better interest when investing abroad (Bremmer and Keat 2009). This 
thesis has shown how the structure, development, use of tools for intervention and policies of 
regional institutions directly and indirectly affect the political risk climate for foreign direct 
investment. As much of the older literature regarding political risk and investments into 
developing countries are based on the behaviour of Western countries, sometimes limiting the 
case studies to only the US and the UK, a case can be made that an emerging power such as 
China does not view political risk in the same way as “the West”. Still, companies from the 
“rising powers”, such as China, India and Brazil, are concerned with their reputation and 
behaviour in the host country. South African companies share these types of concerns, but 
with an added dimension of being companies from one large country investing in another, 
usually smaller, African country (Tjønneland 2014). The thesis aimed to identify and explain 
causal links between the effects of regional integration can have on political risk. With an 
added emphasis on the role of South Africa, this helped explain what kind of relationship 
evolves between a regional hegemon and its smaller neighbouring states within the politics of 
regionalization, and whether the presence of a regional power is beneficial to its neighbouring 
states. A combination of historical factors, current development and descriptive FDI numbers 
could be combined with statistics from agencies specializing in political risk analysis or useful 
datasets such as Quality of Government (2013), to show variations between countries within a 
regional organization. Instead of examining an organization that comprises fifteen member 
states, an approach concentrating on one particular country’s political risk in light of its 
membership in a regional organization could also be interesting future research, in line with 
Te Velde and Bezemer (2006). It is worth noting that “regional actors” have been included in 
overviews of actors who can affect political risk (Jakobsen 2010). This shows that although a 
regional organization like SADC gets its fair share of criticism for being ineffective, potential 
investors and scholars within economics or political science have to take regional actors and 
interests into account when investigating political risk. Analysing regional dynamics and the 
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influence of a regional organization will provide further insights into the reasons why political 
risk can be mitigated within a country or a region. 
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